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Abstract:  We show a negative relation between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate , that 
is, the Phillips curve using a three-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model with childhood 
period and pay-as-you-go pension for older generation under monopolistic competition. We consider 
the effects of a change in nominal wage rate with negative real balance effect and the effects of an 
exogeneous change in labor productivity. In a three periods OLG model there may exist a negative 
real balance effect. A fall (or rise) in nominal wage rate induces a fall (or rise) in the price, then by 
negative real balance effect the unemployment rate rises (or falls), and we get a negative relation 
between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. This conclusion is based on the premise of 
utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization of firms. Therefore, we presented a 
microeconomic foundation of the Phillips curve. About the effects of a change in labor productivity we 
obtain similar results. We also examine the effects of fiscal policy financed by seigniorage.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) presented a microeconomic foundation of the negative relation 
between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, that is, the Phillips Curve (Phillips (1958)) 
using an overlapping generations model (OLG model) under monopolistic competition1. They have 
shown that, the lower the unemployment rate in a period (for example period 𝑡𝑡 − 1), the higher the 
inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Their logic is as follows. They assume that the low (or 
high) unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises (or lowers) the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 by 
learning effect. If the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 increases, the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 falls. Then, by the behavior of firms in monopolistic competiton the price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 
rises given nominal wage rate, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 falls given the 
(expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Alternatively, a decrease in the unemployment rate in 
period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡. Then, the price of the goods falls, and the 
infaltion rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 rises given the (expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. However, we do not find their conclusion that the low unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 
explains the high inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 to be satisfactory. A fall in the price in 
period 𝑡𝑡 means that the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 falls, that is, the low 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 explains the low (not high) inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 
period 𝑡𝑡. 
 Instead, in this paper we consider the effects of a change in nominal wage rate with negative real 
balance effect and the effects of an exogenous change in labor productivity. Changes in labor 
productivity may be due to a change in the unemployment rate in the previous period as assumed 
by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012). According to Tanaka (2020), we use a three-periods OLG model 
with childhood period, younger period and older period. Also we consider a pay-as-you-go pension 
system to bring about the negatiive real balance effect of a fall in nominal wage rate. The negative 
balance effect (or negative Pigou effect) means that by falls in nominal wage rate and the price the 
real asset of consumers (difference between savings and debts) decreases. 
 We will show the negative ralationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the 
same period. Our logic is as follows. If nominal wage rate in a period, for example, period 𝑡𝑡 falls, 
the price of the goods falls. This means that the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 
decreases. By the negative real balance effect aggregate demand for the goods and employment 
decrease and the unemployment rate increases in period 𝑡𝑡. Alternatively, if nominal wage rate in 
period 𝑡𝑡 rises, the price of the goods rises, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 
increases. By the negative real balance effect aggregate demand for the goods and employment 
increase and the unemployment rate decreases in period 𝑡𝑡. About the effects of an exogenous 
change in labor productivity we obtain similar results. For details please see Section 4.  
  Some other references about Phillips curve are Lucas (1972), Calvo (1983), Mankiw and Reis 
(2002) and Woodford (1996). According to Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012), every work on the Phillips 
curve presumes some market imperfection, and it implies that if there does not exist some price 
stickiness assumption or imperfect information, the negative correlation between inflation and un- 
employment will disappear. This paper will show that it isn't. 
 In Section 2 we analyze behaviors of consumers and firms. In Section 3 we consider the equilibrium 
of the economy with involuntary unemployment. In Section 4 we show the main results about the 
negative relation between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate due to a change in nominal 
wage rate. We also examine the effects of fiscal policy financed by seigniorage and the Phillips curve 
due to an exogenous change in labor productivity. The effect of fiscal policy is represented as left-
ward shift of the Phillips curve. 
 
2.  Behaviors of consumers and firms 
 
1 We consider the relation between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, that is, the rate of a 
change in the price of the goods give nominal wage rate.  
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 We consider a three-periods (childhood, young and old) OLG model under monopolistic competition. 
It is an extension and arrangement of the model in Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016). There 
is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of goods indexed by 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. Each good 
is monopolistically produced by Firm 𝑧𝑧. Consumers live over three periods, period 0 (childhood 
period), period 1 (young period) and period 2(old period).There are consumers of three generations, 
childhood, youger and older generations, at the same time. They can supply only one unit of labor 
when they are young (period 1). 
 
2.1  Consumers 
 
 We use the following notations.  
  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): price of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖: consumption basket in period  𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = ��10 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−1𝜂𝜂 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝜂𝜂 > 1. 𝑐𝑐0(𝑧𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 0. It is constant. 𝑝𝑝0(𝑧𝑧): price of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 0. We assume 𝑝𝑝0(𝑧𝑧) = 1. 𝑋𝑋0 = �∫10 𝑐𝑐0(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−1𝜂𝜂.  It is constant. 𝑋𝑋0’: consumtion basket in the childhood period of a consumer of the next generation  𝛽𝛽: disutility of labor, 𝛽𝛽 > 0.  𝑊𝑊: nominal wage rate. Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer. 𝐿𝐿: employment of each firm and the total employment. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓: population of labor or employment in the full-employment state. 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿): labor productivity. 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) ≥ 1. 𝑅𝑅: unemployment benefit fo an unemployed consumer, 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑋𝑋0. 𝑅𝑅′: unemployment benefit fo an unemployed consumer in the next generation, 𝑅𝑅′ = 𝑋𝑋0’. Θ: the tax for unemployment benefit. Φ: pay-as-you-go pension for a consumer of the older generation. Φ′: pay-as-you-go pension for a consumer of the younger generation when he is retired. Ψ: the tax for pay-as-you-go pension. 
  
Consumers in period 0 consume the goods by borrowing money from consumers of the previous 
generation or the government (for example, scholarship). They must repay the debts when they are 
young. However, if they are unemployed, they can not repay the debts. Then, they receive the 
unemployment benefits which are coverred by taxes on employed younger generation consumers. 
Thus, employed younger genartion consumers must pay the taxes for unemployment benefit as well 
as they must repay their own debts. 𝑅𝑅 and Θ satisfy the follwiing relation. 
                                 (𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 − 𝐿𝐿)𝑅𝑅 = 𝐿𝐿Θ.                                    (1) 
In addition we consider the existence of pay-as-you-go pension for consumers of the older generation. 
They are also coverred by taxes o employed consumers of the younger generation. Φ and Ψ satisfy 
                                  𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ = 𝐿𝐿Ψ.                                        (2) 
Consumptions in period 0 of the consumers are constant, and in period 1 they determine their 
consumptions in periods 1 and 2, and their labor supply.  𝛿𝛿 is the definition function. If a consumer 
is employed, 𝛿𝛿 = 1 ; if he is not employed, 𝛿𝛿 = 0 . The labor productivity is 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) . We assume 
increasing or constant returns to scale technology. Thus, 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)is increasing or constant with respect 
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to the employment of a firm 𝐿𝐿. We define the employment elasticity of the labor productivity as follows.  𝜁𝜁 = 𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)𝐿𝐿 . 
We assume 0 ≤ 𝜁𝜁 < 1. Increasing returns to scale means 𝜁𝜁 > 0. 𝜂𝜂 is (the inverse of) the degree of 
differentiation of the goods. In the limit when 𝜂𝜂 → +∞, the goods are homogeneous. We assume  �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁) < 1 
so that the profits of firms are positive. 
 The utility of consumers of one generation over two periods is  𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋0,𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝛿𝛿,𝛽𝛽) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋0,𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽. 
We assume that 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋0,𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one (linearly homogeneous). Note that 𝑋𝑋0 
is constant. The budget constraint is  �10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ). 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧) is the expectation of the price of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 2. The Lagrange function is  ℒ = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋0,𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 − 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 − Π −Φ′ + 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 + 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)�. 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are  
                   
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧),                         (3) 
and  
                    
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧).                (4) 
They are rewritten as  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧), (5) 
  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧). (6) 
Let  
 𝑃𝑃1 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 , 𝑃𝑃2 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂. 
They are prices of the consumption baskets in period 1 and period 2. By some calculations we obtain 
(please see Appendix)  
       𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋0,𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�                        (7) 
= 𝜆𝜆[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)], 
  
                                
𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 ,                  (8) 
  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ). (9) 
The indirect utility of consumers is written as follows  
 𝑉𝑉 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) [𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)] − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽. (10) 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is a function which is homogeneous of degree one. The reservation nominal wage rate 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
is a solution of the following equation.  
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1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) [𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 + Π + Φ′ − 𝑅𝑅 − Θ −Ψ] − 𝛽𝛽 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) (Π + Φ′). 
From this  𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2)𝛽𝛽 + 𝑅𝑅 + Θ + Ψ. 
The labor supply is indivisible. If 𝑊𝑊 > 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, the total labor supply is 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. If 𝑊𝑊 < 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, it is zero. If 𝑊𝑊 =𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, employment and unemployment are indifferent for consumers, and there exists no involuntary 
unemployment even if 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. 
 Indivisibility of labor supply may be due to the fact that there exists minimum standard of living even 
in the advanced economy (please see Otaki (2015)). 
 Let 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1. This is the expected inflation rate (plus one). Since 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is homogeneous of degree 
one, the reservation real wage rate is  𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜑𝜑(1,𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽 + 𝑅𝑅 + Θ + Ψ𝑃𝑃1 . 
If the value of 𝜌𝜌 is given, 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 is constant. 
 Otaki (2007) assumes that the wage rate is equal to the reservation wage rate in the equilibrium. 
However, there exists no mechanism to equalize them. We assume that 𝛽𝛽 and 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 are not so large. 
 
2.2  Firms 
 
 Let  𝛼𝛼 = 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑋𝑋2 , 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. 
From (5) ∼ (9),  𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Since  𝑋𝑋1 = 𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 , 
we have  
(𝑋𝑋1)1𝜂𝜂−1 = ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 = �𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1. 
Therefore,  
        𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)�𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 
= �𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Thus,  𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1𝜂𝜂 = �𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1(𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧))−1. 
Hence,  𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝛼𝛼[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
This is demand for good 𝑧𝑧 of an individual of younger generation. Similarly, his demand for good 𝑧𝑧 
in period 2 is  𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧) = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ′ − 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]𝑃𝑃2 �𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃2 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
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Let 𝑀𝑀 be the total savings of consumers of the older generation carried over from their period 1. It is 
written as  𝑀𝑀 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)[𝑊𝑊�𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π� + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ− 𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅� − 𝐿𝐿�(Θ� + Ψ�)]. 𝑊𝑊� , 𝐿𝐿� and Π� are the nominal wage rate, the employment and the profit in the previous period. 𝑅𝑅�,Θ� 
and Ψ�  are the unempoymemt benefit, the tax for the unempoymemt benefit and the tax for the pay-
as-you-go pension in the previous period. Note that Φ is the pay-as-you-go pension for a consumer 
of the older generation. 𝑀𝑀 is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation 
consumers including the pay-as-you-go pensions they receive in their period 2. It is the planned 
consumption that is determined in period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net savings is the 
difference between 𝑀𝑀 and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their period 2, as follows: 𝑀𝑀 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝑊𝑊� 𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π� − 𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅� − 𝐿𝐿�(Θ� + Ψ�)� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ. 
With this 𝑀𝑀 their demand for good 𝑧𝑧 is  𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
The government expenditure constitutes the national income as well as consumptions of younger and 
older generations. The total demand for good 𝑧𝑧 is written as  
 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂. 𝑌𝑌 is the effective demand defined by  
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐿𝐿(Θ + Ψ)� + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 𝐺𝐺  is the government expenditure other than the pay-as-yu-go pensions and the unemployment 
benefits, and 𝑅𝑅′  is the consumption in the childhood period of consumers of the next generation 
(about this demand function please see Otaki (2007), (2009)). The total employment, the total profits 
and the total government expenditure are  �10 𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐿𝐿, �10 Π𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = Π, �10 𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐺𝐺. 
We have  𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = −𝜂𝜂 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)−1−𝜂𝜂(𝑃𝑃1)−𝜂𝜂 = −𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
From 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
The profit of Firm 𝑧𝑧 is  𝜋𝜋(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧). 𝑃𝑃1 is given for Firm 𝑧𝑧. Note that the employment elasticity of the labor productivity is  𝜁𝜁 = 𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)𝐿𝐿 . 
The condition for profit maximization with respect to 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) is  𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝑦𝑦′ 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)2 𝑊𝑊� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) 
= 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 1 − 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) 𝑊𝑊� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) 
= 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 0. 
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From this  𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ − 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊(1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 1𝜂𝜂 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Therefore, we obtain  𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊�1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
With increasing returns to scale, since 𝜁𝜁 > 0, 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) is lower than that in a case without increasing 
returns to scale given the value of 𝑊𝑊. 
 
3.  The market equilibrium 
 
3.1 The equilibrium with involuntary unemployment 
 
 Since the model is symmetric, the prices of all goods are equal. Then,  𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Hence  
                          𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑊𝑊�1−1𝜂𝜂�(1+𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿).                     (11) 
The real wage rate is  𝜔𝜔 = 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃1 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
If 𝜁𝜁 is constant, this is increasing with respect to 𝐿𝐿. 
 The nominal aggregate supply of the goods is equal to  𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π = 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
The nominal aggregate demand is  
 𝛼𝛼�𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐿𝐿(Θ + Ψ)� + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 
= 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐿𝐿(Θ + Ψ)� + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 
Since they are equal,  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐿𝐿(Θ + Ψ)� + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀.  
From (1) and (2) we have 
 
(𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 − 𝐿𝐿)𝑅𝑅 = 𝐿𝐿Θ, 
and 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ = 𝐿𝐿Ψ. 
Therefore, we get 
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ− 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅) + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀.  
This means  
                       𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅)+𝑅𝑅′+𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀1−𝛼𝛼                         (12) 
In real terms  
 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅�+𝑅𝑅′+𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1(1−𝛼𝛼) , (13) 
or 
 
                          𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅�+𝑅𝑅′+𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) .                           (14) 11−𝛼𝛼 is a multiplier. (13) and (14) mean that the employment 𝐿𝐿 is determined by 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚. It can not 
be larger than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. However, it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 (𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓). Then, there exists 
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involuntary umemployment. Since the real wage rate 𝜔𝜔 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) is increasing with 
respect to 𝐿𝐿, and the reservation real wage rate 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 is constant, if 𝜔𝜔 > 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 there exists no 
mechanism to reduce the difference between them. 
 
3.2 Negative real balance effect 
  
 If the nominal wage rate falls, the price of the goods (price of consumption basket) proportionately 
falls. If the employment changes, the rate of a fall in the nominal wage rate and that of the price may 
be different in the case of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. We assume that the difference 
is small. We can suppose that the real values of 𝐺𝐺, Φ, Φ′, 𝑅𝑅′ do not change even when the price of 
the goods falls. On the other hand, the nominal value of 𝑅𝑅 and   
Then, whether the aggregate demand increases or decreases when the nominal wage rate and the 
price of the goods fall depend on whether  𝑀𝑀 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ− 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅 
Is positive or negative. If 𝑀𝑀− 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ− 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅<0, there is a negative real balance effect (Pigou effect)2.  
 
4.  Phillips Curve and fiscal policy 
  
4. 1  A chgange in nominal wage rate with begative real balance effect 
 
 Suppse that the nominal wage rate falls. From (11) the price of the goods also falls. If the negative 
real balance effect works, the real aggregate demand decreases. Then, the output and the 
employment decrease. Therefore, the lower price is accompanied by employment loss. Alternatively, 
suppose that the nominal wage rate rises. The price of the goods also rises. If the negative real 
balance effect works, the real aggregate demand increases. Then, the output and the employment 
increase. Therefore, higher price is accompanied by an increase in employment. Thus, we obtain a 
negative relationship between the price and the unemployment rate (positive relationship between 
the price and employment) as represented by the Phillips curve. 
 Therefore, we obtain the negative ralationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation 
rate in the same period. Figure 1 depicts an example the Phillips Curve. 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 denotes the 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡.  
 
 
2 About the discussion of real balance effect please see Pigou (1934) and Kalecki (1940). 
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Figure 1: Phillips Curve  
 
 
4. 2 Fiscal Policy 
 
 Let 𝑇𝑇 be the tax revenue other than the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system and the 
unemployment benefits. Then, the budget constraint of the government is 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑇𝑇, and the aggregate 
demand is 
             𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′ − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐿𝐿(Θ + Ψ) − 𝑇𝑇� + 𝑅𝑅′ + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 with 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑇𝑇.           (15) 
With this aggregate demand (14) is 
                      𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ′−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Φ−𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅−𝑇𝑇�+𝑅𝑅′+𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)  with 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑇𝑇.                         (16) 
This implies that the balanced budget multiplier is one.  
 Given labor productivity 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) and nominal wage rate 𝑊𝑊 the price of the goods 𝑃𝑃1 is determined 
by (11). If the government expenditure 𝐺𝐺 increases given 𝑇𝑇, that is, an increment of the government 
expenditure is financed by seigniorage, from (16) employment 𝐿𝐿 increases given the price 𝑃𝑃1. Then, 
the Phillips curve in Figure 1 shifts to the left as in Figure 2, the employment increases and the 
unemployment rate decreases given the inflation rate. With increasing returns to scale 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)  is 
increasing with respect to 𝐿𝐿. However, employment will still increase in that case. From (11) and (16) 
we obtain 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 = 1(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑊𝑊>0, 
 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃1𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 = − 1(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃1𝑦𝑦′(𝐿𝐿)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) < 0. 
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                   Figure 2 (a)                                     Figure 2 (b) 
         
Figure 2 (a) depicts a case of 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 0 (constant returns to scale), and Figure 2 (b) depicts a case 
of 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) > 0 (increasing returns to scale). 
 
 
4.3 Fiscal policy is a fiscal-monetary policy 
 
The money suppy equals the sum of 
1) Consumptions of the older generation consumers – pay-as-you-go pensions,  
2) Government expenditure – taxes. 
If the increase in the government expenditure is financed by seigniorage, it equals the increase in 
money supply. Therefore, the fiscal policy is also a fiscal-monetary policy. The increase in money 
supply does not raise the price. Thus, money is not neutral. 
 
4.4 Exogenous changes in labor productivity 
 
 We consider exogenous changes in labor productivity given nominal wage rate. It may be due to a 
change in the unemployment rate in the previous period as assumed by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 
2012). Suppose that the labor productivity 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) in a period, for example, period 𝑡𝑡 increases to 𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) with a constant 𝜃𝜃 > 1 given 𝐿𝐿. From (13) if 𝑔𝑔 and 𝑚𝑚 are constant, employment 𝐿𝐿 
decreases, that is, the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 increases.  (11) means that the price of the 
goods in period 𝑡𝑡 given 𝑊𝑊 falls because η an 𝜁𝜁 are constant. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 be the price of 
the goods (price of the concumption basket) in period 𝑡𝑡 and that in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1. Then, the inflation 
rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1, falls given 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1.  
 Alternatively, a decrease in the labor productivity (𝜃𝜃 < 1) increases employment, decreases the 
unemployment rate, and raises the price of the goods and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡𝑡. 
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4.5 Analysis by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) 
 
 Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) suppose that the low (or high) unemployment rate in a period, for 
example, period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises (or lowers) the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 by learning effect. If the 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 increases, the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 falls. Then, from 
(11) the price of the goods rises, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 falls given the 
(expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Alternatively, a decrease in the unemployment rate in 
period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 rases the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡. Then, the price of the goods falls, and the 
infaltion rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 rises given the (expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Thus, they have shown the negative relation between the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 −
1 and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 1. On the other hand, a fall in the price 
in period 𝑡𝑡 means that the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 falls, that is, the low 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 explains the low (not high) inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 
period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1. 
 Their Phillips curve is depicted in Figure 3. 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 denotes the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Phillips curve by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 We have shown that in a three-periods overlapping generations model under monopolistic 
competiton changes in labor prodictivity bring about the negative relation between the 
unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the same period. This conclusion is based on the 
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premise of utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization of firms. Therefore, we have 
presented a microeconomic foundation of the Phillips curve. 
 
Appendix: Derivations of (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
 
 From (5) and (6)  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 = 𝜆𝜆�10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 = 𝜆𝜆�10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
Since 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one,  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2. 
Thus, we obtain  ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2, 
and  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜆𝜆[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)]. 
 
From (3) and (4), we have  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂, 
and  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂 . 
They mean  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂�10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
and  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂�10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
Then, we obtain  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃1, 
and  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃2. 
From them we get  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2), 
 
 
𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 ,  
and  
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 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ). 
Since 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2)  is homogeneous of degree one, 𝜆𝜆  is a function of 𝑃𝑃1  and 𝑃𝑃2 , and 1𝜆𝜆  is 
homogeneous of degree one because proportional increases in 𝑃𝑃1 and 𝑃𝑃2 reduce 𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2 at 
the same rate given 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. We obtain the following indirect utility function.  
 𝑉𝑉 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) [𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π + Φ + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑅𝑅 − 𝛿𝛿(Θ + Ψ)] − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽.  𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is a function which is homogenous of degree one. 
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